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Abstract: In this article the authors discuss whether and how philosophical 
practice in general and the Socratic dialogue method in particular can be 
understood, not only as a form of counseling or education, but also as a form of 
research. For this purpose references and comparisons to so-called participatory 
action research are made, on the one hand. On the other, by means of several 
short case studies, a project about Socratic dialoguing is presented, which was 
conducted at so-called Norwegian folk high schools and which should point out 
the inherent research-character of philosophical practice.  
Keywords: philosophical practice, participatory action research, Socratic 
method, Norwegian Folk High School 
 
Resumen: En este artículo, los autores discutirán si es possible, y cómo, la 
Filosofía Aplicada en general y el método del diálogo socrático en particular 
puede ser catalogados no solo como una forma de orientación o de educación 
sino, además, como un mecanismo para investigar. A tal fin, se articulan 
comparaciones con la, así denominada, investigación-acción participativa. Por 
otro lado, partiendo de un conjunto de pequeños casos, se presenta un proyecto 
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sobre diálogos socráticos. Éste se llevó a término en las universidades populares 
noruegas, lo cual pone de manifiesto el caracter investigador inherente a la 
Filosofía Aplicada.  
Palabras clave: philosophical practice, participatory action research, Socratic 





Today, one can find a vast amount of publications on philosophical 
practice. By now, there is also a diverse range of methodologies in 
use within the field1. Nevertheless, since the “hour of birth” of 
philosophical practice, the discussion on what kind of activity it 
actually represents and how it can be defined, did not fall silent 
until today. For this reason, one of the guiding questions of this 
article reads: What is a philosophical practitioner actually doing, 
when performing philosophical practice – and to what extent can 
this activity be understood, not only as a form of counseling or 
education, but also as a form of research? 
 
 
Philosophical practice as a counseling or educational activity 
 
Since its beginnings in the early 1980ies, many practitioners 
proclaimed that philosophical practice is a counseling activity – so-
called philosophical counseling. Other approaches, like the Socratic 
method after Leonard Nelson, or the so-called Philo Cafè as 
introduced by Marc Sautet, suggest philosophical practice to be 
more of an educational activity. The respective (academic) 
literature on philosophical practice, however, shows that 
                                                          
1
 see WEISS, Michael N. (ed.): The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for 
Philosophical Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015. 
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understanding it either as an educational or as a counseling activity 
is both problematic.  
There are several publications, which discuss the identity and 
uniqueness of philosophical counseling compared to 
psychotherapy, coaching, life counseling, pastoral care etc.2 In our 
opinion, however, the respective literature on the matter remains 
inconclusive. In its essence there seem to be too little decisive 
aspects that would identify philosophical counseling – mainly 
practiced in one-on-one settings – as clearly genuine and different 
from other counseling approaches, like existential analysis or 
existential psychotherapy3. Furthermore, our personal and 
professional experiences over the last years, leads us to the 
question, whether philosophical counseling really deserves the 
name “counseling” or whether it actually is an activity of a rather 
different kind4.  
When understanding philosophical practice as an educational 
activity, then it is obviously not an educational activity in the 
traditional sense – though without any doubt certain philosophical 
practices can lead to learning effects with the participants. 
However, these effects are not the outcome or the result of teaching 
as we normally understand it. Rather, one can interpret the kind of 
learning achieved in philosophical practice in the sense of so-called 
                                                          
2
 see i.e.: ACHENBACH, Gerd: “Philosophy, Philosophical Practice, and 
Psychotherapy”, in LAHAV, Ran & TILLMANN, Maria da Venza (eds.): Essays 
on Philosophical Counseling, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1995. 
Or: LAHAV, Ran: “A Conceptual Framework for Philosophical Counseling: 
Worldview Interpretation”, in: LAHAV, Ran & TILLMANN, Maria da Venza 
(eds.): Essays on Philosophical Counseling, University Press of America, 
Lanham, MD, 1995. 
3
 see ibidem, p. 11 
4
 see HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: “The Call and Practices of Wonder. How to 
evoke a Socratic Community of Wonder in Professional Settings”, in WEISS, 
Michael N. (ed.): The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical 
Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015. p. 219f. 
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anamnesis. Anamnesis, as a certain form of learning, was presented 
in the Plato’s dialogue Menon, where only by means of questioning 
and not by direct teaching Socrates succeeds in making a slave 
(who never received any previous training in mathematics) solve a 
geometrical problem. 
One has to admit that many philosophical practitioners do 
neither refer to counseling nor to education when defining their 
work-approach. Often they rather refer to terms like critical 
thinking, existential reflection, philosophizing or dialoguing – but 
these activities are not necessarily unique to philosophical practice 
(i.e. existential reflection or dialoguing is done in other professions 
or disciplines too). To put it in other words, a teacher is supposed 
to teach, a therapist is supposed to treat, a counselor is supposed to 
counsel etc. – therefore the question is: What is a philosophical 
practitioner actually doing when she performs philosophical 
practice? To approach this question it is necessary to go into the 
specific context of this particular activity. 
 
 
Philosophical practice as a research activity 
 
Until now research in philosophical practice has been a rare 
phenomenon, so to say. This issue of the Haser journal is an 
“exception to the rule”, being one of the few publications in which 
philosophical practice and research is discussed. In this article we 
would like to take it even a step further – our intention is to re-
interpret philosophical practice both as a narrative-based method of 
investigation and as a research activity in itself. In order to do so, 
we will relate the so-called Socratic dialogue method to what is 
called participatory action research5. In the course of this article we 
                                                          
5
 see CHEVALIER, Jaques M. & BUCKLES, Daniel J.: Participatory Action 
Research: Theory and Methods for Engaged Inquiry, Routledge, London & New 
York, 2013. 
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will present several short case studies, which should exemplify how 
and why we understand philosophical practice as a research activity 
in general and a form of participatory action research in particular. 
However, before introducing these short cases, we would first like 
to make some theoretical and methodological remarks on the 
Socratic dialogue method.  
 
 
The Socratic dialogue method after Leonard Nelson 
 
Today many philosophical practitioners make use of the so-called 
Socratic method as developed by Leonard Nelson6. When 
conceptualizing it, Nelson’s intention was to offer a dialogue 
method for groups in order to make the respective participants of 
such a dialogue (like students) philosophize about the topic at 
stake. A unique characteristic of this method is that it does not 
require any philosophical pre-knowledge with the participants. 
Another central aspect of the Socratic method is that the chosen 
topic, subject or phenomenon of the dialogue is investigated by 
means of concrete cases and experiences, formulated as narratives. 
A philosophical investigation performed according to the Socratic 
method consists of several steps, its most central ones are briefly 
summarized in the following. 
 
 
The steps of a Socratic dialogue  
 
First, a topic is chosen, preferably a philosophical term i.e. an 
ethical value like honesty, but it can also be a term like self-
knowledge, meaning of life, etc.. Then the dialogue participants are 
                                                          
6
 see HECKMANN, Gustav: Das sokratische Gespräch: Erfahrungen in 
philosophischen Hochschulseminaren, Schroedel, Hannover, 1981. 
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invited to tell a personal memory-based story, in which they once 
experienced the topic at stake. In the next phase these narratives are 
reflected and investigated in order to make definitions what the 
topic means according to each narrative. Finally, the group tries to 
make a more general definition out of the definitions already made 
due to the different narratives.  
 
 
Philosophizing by means of story-telling and experience-
sharing 
 
An important question, which comes up at this point is how and 
why such a dialogue can be called philosophical? As described 
previously, narrated experiences represent the starting point of a 
Socratic dialogue. From these specific cases the investigation leads 
deeper into the subject matter in terms of making definitions about 
what the topic at stake actually means. And it is this “movement” 
in the thinking process, which goes from the concrete (the personal 
stories) to the general (the general definition) – a characteristic 
which can also be found in the dialogues of Socrates – that makes 
such a dialogue philosophical: If one assumes that the activity of 
philosophizing means to reflect and investigate general aspects of 
the human condition (like empathy, freedom, the search for 
meaning, etc.), then such an activity is certainly performed by 
means of the Socratic method as described here (since general 
aspects of the human condition, like ethical values, are reflected by 
means of story-telling and experience-sharing). Moreover, with an 
emphasis on the term to investigate, one can already get a first idea 
of how and why the Socratic method can also be understood as a 
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Forming a community of inquiry and performing narratives 
 
A further characteristic of the Socratic method after Nelson is that 
the dialogue facilitator (often a philosophical practitioner) and the 
participants form a so-called community of inquiry, to use a term 
coined by Mathew Lipman7. In other words, the facilitator and the 
participants investigate a topic together – there is no expert-layman 
hierarchy, there are only “co-researchers” in a Socratic dialogue. 
This is the first way in which this dialogue setting relates to the 
practice-oriented research approach of participatory action 
research, as it will be described afterwards. The other way is 
concerned with performing the narrations, that is the plot-telling as 
such, which can be identified as action (which in the next instance 
turns into interaction between the dialogue participants). 
 
 
Ricœur-inspired Socratic narratives 
 
By analogy to Ricœur, the narrative process in Socratic dialogues 
may also be considered as a particular kind of action, understood as 
follows: “According to Ricœur, the work of art – including literary 
fiction – may be considered as a particular kind of action.”8 The 
question now is what kind of action is this narrative process in a 
Socratic dialogue about? In our opinion it is an action of self-
reflection. For example, by answering a reflective question or 
sharing a story in the course of a Socratic dialogue, the storyteller 
                                                          
7
 see LIPMAN, Matthew: Thinking in Education, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003. p. 84. 
8
 BJØRSNØS, Annlaug: “Den lange veien til forståelse. Om Paul Ricœr og 
litteraturens epistemologiske funksjon”, in Norsk Litteraturvitenskapelig 
Tidsskrift, Nr. 1, Vol. 15, Trondheim, 2012, p. 61. 
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herself can reach a revised understanding of herself. That means 
coming to a clearer or richer understanding of herself, or just 
starting to understand herself. To put it into more concrete terms: 
Such a self-reflective action is taken in the course of a Socratic 
dialogue, when i.e. a participant starts to ask herself : “What does 
the story that I just told (or heard) tell me about me?” Asking 
oneself such questions often happens unexpectedly with the 
participants, but it can bring revealing self-insights for the 
respective participant to the fore9. Such kinds of “actions” are of 
course neither foreseeable nor predictable in the beginning of a 
dialogue. But the presupposition in order to “perform” such self-
reflections is to share personal narratives. 
Furthermore, hermeneutics (that is the interpretation of a 
literary work, a narrative, a metaphor) and the self-reflective 
process of a Socratic dialogue seem to correspond with each other. 
The (trans-)formation (formation in the sense of “danning” in 
Norwegian) of the self, reflected in the “telling“ of the respective 
narratives and the resulting changes in self-understanding happen 
simultaneously. But it seems to be the latter that is the object, the 
phenomenon of a Socratic dialogue in the sense of research.  
 
 
The actions of Socrates – philosophical midwifery and irony 
 
The term Socrates used to describe his way of conducting 
dialogues was maieutics – the art of midwifery of the soul. The 
self-image of Socrates was the one of a midwife assisting a 
pregnant soul in the birth process – an image, in which one 
certainly can find similarities to counseling activities. However, 
                                                          
9
 see HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: “The Call and Practices of Wonder. How to 
evoke a Socratic Community of Wonder in Professional Settings”, in WEISS, 
Michael N. (ed.): The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical 
Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015. p. 219f. 
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when one takes a closer look at what the figure of Socrates was 
actually doing in those dialogues, it was far more than counseling. 
Rather, it was to investigate a topic, a term or a phenomenon 
together with his dialogue partners, simultaneously as giving birth 
to new stages of self-insight among these adepts.  
 
  
Investigation and formation 
 
At this point, two key-aspects of the Socratic method have come to 
the fore: investigation and formation (“Bildung” in German), both 
approached simultaneously. In other words, in his dialogues the 
role of Socrates was not the one of a traditional teacher, nor the one 
of a counselor – it was the one of a researcher and a releaser. 
However, the relationship between Socrates and his dialogue 
partners was not constituted according to a researcher/interviewer 
role model. Rather, he saw both himself as well as his dialogue 
partners as investigators or “co-researchers” and partakers in the 
“birth process”. At first sight we have to admit that this does not 
sound convincing, since Socrates often introduced himself as a 
layman on the matter and his dialogue partner as an expert. 
However, according to Sæverot this attitude of Socrates is not only 
a trick to “lure” his opponents into a deeper investigation of the 
subject matter10. His saying that “I know nothing except that I 
nothing know” conceals a double meaning, pointing directly to the 
intrinsic structure of his philosophical midwifery method and the 
“judgmental” aspects of the formation processes. With this not-
knowing-attitude Socrates tries to give his adepts a definite “push” 
towards self-reflection in the sense of “Know thyself”.  
                                                          
10
 see BRUNSTAD, Paul Otto, REINDAL, Solveig Magnus & SÆVEROTH, 
Herner (eds.): Eksistens og Pedagogikk, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2015. 
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With the role of Socrates as a “co-researcher” in mind, and 
self-reflection as a specific action in the course of a Socratic 
dialogue, we would like to continue with a research approach, 





In general terms, action research represents a form of research, 
which has the explicit aim to solve a particular problem and to 
produce guidelines of best practice11. In other words, action 
research is solution- and practice-oriented. In simple terms, action 
research investigates certain actions, which are performed in a 
certain context. It can be undertaken in smaller groups like teams, 
but also in larger organizational structures like in educational 
institutions, companies and even in local communities, which face 
a particular problem. Often, this type of research is performed for 
the purpose of reflecting, changing and improving a given situation 
(like improving certain strategies or practices). People involved in 
action research processes are sometimes also called communities of 
practice12 – a concept which additionally is rooted in the 
community of inquiry approach as introduced in American 
pragmatism13. Therefore it is also based on experience-sharing by 
means of story-telling. In this way, the challenges we meet in 
action research can also involve problems of ethical nature (i.e. 
social predicaments) or problems in a socio-pedagogical context 
(i.e. issues concerning “understanding-the-self-and-the-other”).  
                                                          
11
 see DENSCOMBE Martyn: Good Research Guide: For small-scale social 
research projects, Open University Press, Berkshire, GBR, 2010. p. 6. 
12
 LAVE, Jean & WENGER, Etienne: Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral 
Participation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. 
13
 see LIPMAN, Matthew: Thinking in Education, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003. p. 84. 
PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE AS ACTION RESEARCH 




The community of inquiry concept and participatory action 
research 
 
As we have seen, the community of inquiry concept plays not only 
a central role in the Socratic method, but also in action research – 
especially in a certain type of action research called participatory 
action research. The term participatory action research was 
introduced by Kurt Lewin in the 1940s14. It intends to point out the 
unique feature of this form of research: research should not be done 
“on” or “for”, but “with” people. In the introduction of their 
anthology The SAGE Handbook of Action Research, Peter Reason 
and Hilary Bradbury state that “communities of inquiry and action 
evolve and address questions and issues that are significant for 
those who participate as co-researchers.”15 In this way, like in the 
Socratic method after Nelson, also participatory action research 
dismisses traditional expert-layman hierarchies (which is often in 
place in other forms of research) and replaces it with a 
researcher/co-researcher setting. The underlying assumption here is 
that not only researchers possess valid knowledge, methods and 
capabilities in order to reflect and to solve a certain problem, but so 
do the people too, who are directly concerned with this problem 
(either at work, schools, hospitals, local communities etc.).  
 
 
Participatory action research and Socratic dialoguing 
 
                                                          
14
 see LEWIN, Kurt: "Action Research and Minority Problems", in Journal of 
Social Issues, Nr. 2, Vol. 2, 1946. Pags. 34–46. 
15
 REASON, Peter & BRADBURY, Hilary (eds.): The SAGE Handbook of 
Action Research: Participative Inquiry and Practice, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 
2008. p. 1. 
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Applied in business organizations, in educational contexts and in 
local communities, participatory action research intends to integrate 
the following three aspects: participation (life in society and 
democracy), action (engagement with experience and history) and 
research (soundness in thought and the growth of knowledge)16. In 
the further course of this article we will point out how and why 
these three aspects of participation, action and research are also of 
central relevance in Socratic dialogues.  
In order to do so, we would like to present several short case 
studies in the following. These studies are supposed to exemplify 
and corroborate our interpretation of philosophical practice as a 
philosophical “version” of participatory action research. These case 
studies will present different Socratic dialogues, which were 
performed in the course of an educational project in which 
philosophical practitioners trained teachers from Norwegian folk 
high schools. The purpose of this project was that these teachers 
acquire the necessary skills to facilitate Socratic dialogues at their 
schools. However, before we go into the short case studies, we 
would like to make some general remarks about Norwegian folk 
high schools, since they represent unique and quite different 




The movement of Folk High Schools 
 
So-called folk high schools have a long tradition in the 
Scandinavian countries (there are about 70 folk high schools in 
Norway alone). Their founding father was the Dane N.F.S. 
Grundtvig, whose pedagogical ideas were disseminated early in the 
                                                          
16
 see CHEVALIER, Jaques M. & BUCKLES, Daniel J.: Participatory Action 
Research: Theory and Methods for Engaged Inquiry, Routledge, London & New 
York, 2013. 
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 century. His specifications on what a folk high school should 
be can be found on the common website of the Norwegian folk 
high schools
17
. Here is a short summary: 
Grundtvig is the Danish ideological father of the folk high 
schools, though his own ideas on education had a broader focus. He 
was a typical representative of the Enlightenment, and the common 
denominator of all pedagogical efforts of Grundtvig was to 
promote a spirit of freedom, poetry and disciplined creativity, 
within all branches of educational life.  
Grundtvig’s idea of a folk high school was a school for life, 
different from the traditional Gymnasium. The keyword was 
enlightenment of the spirit, and the most important component was 
the free, animated communication between teacher and students in 
and outside the classroom. According to Grundtvig, the dialogue 
was the unique method of the “curriculum”, which also 
comprehended everyday life as a learning arena. The sole aim was 
life enlightenment (“livsopplysning” in Norwegian). When it came 
to human life, students and teachers were equal. He promoted 
values such as wisdom, compassion, identification and equality and 
opposed all compulsion, including exams, as deadening to the 
human soul. Instead Grundtvig advocated to unleash human 
creativity according to the universally creative order of life. 
Therefore a spirit of freedom, cooperation and discovery was to be 
kindled in individuals, in science, and in the civil society as a 
whole. 
On the same website one can also find information about what 
the schools are like today and what they focus on18:  
 
                                                          
17
 see FOLKEHØYSKOLENE: “Hva er folkehøyskole?” available in HU 
http://www.folkehogskole.no/hva-er-folkehogskoleUH (last access October 16th, 
2015). 
18
 see also OHREM, Sigurd & HADDAL, Odd (eds.): med livet som pensum. 
danning og læringsprosesser i folkehøgskolen, Cappelen Damm, Oslo, 2011. 
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Folk high schools are one-year boarding schools offering a variety 
of exciting non-traditional and non-academic subjects, as well as 
academic subjects. The idea of folk high schools is learning for 
life, an opportunity to grow both individually, socially, and 
academically in small learning communities. All students live on 
campus in close contact with staff and their fellow students. One 
important part of the folk high school experience is to form a 
community, in and out of class. … The folk high schools do not 
grant degrees or conduct exams, the aim is to provide a formative 
(Bildungs) year, nurturing "the whole person". By taking away the 
pressure of grades and exams, you learn to motivate yourself. You 
choose the topics that interest you, for instance theatre, outdoor 
life, music, creative arts, media and communications, philosophy. 
Folk high schools are separate from the rest of Norway's education 
system. Students can be any age and can have any level of 






Introduction of the short case studies 
 
With this conceptual background of folk high schools in mind, we 
would like to introduce the previously mentioned short case studies 
about different Socratic dialogues, which took place in a teach-the-
teachers course on Socratic dialoguing at this type of schools. In 
2013 the course was held for the first time, and it lasted for a period 
of one year. About 35 teachers participated and about 10 
philosophical practitioners conducted training. The schedule 
included two full days of general meetings with all participants and 
all practitioners, a full day of regional meeting and two full days of 
local meetings. In the general meetings at the beginning of the 
                                                          
19
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course lectures on the Socratic method and philosophical practice 
were given, on the one hand. On the other, participants could get 
first experiences with the Socratic method, since the philosophical 
practitioners were facilitating respective dialogues in small groups. 
In the regional meeting one of the philosophical practitioners 
facilitated a Socratic dialogue with the teachers of 2-4 schools, 
which participated in the course. Here the goal was to go further 
into the method by means of a learning-by-doing approach. In the 
local meeting the teachers who participated in the course had to 
facilitate Socratic dialogues at their own schools – supervised by 
one of the philosophical practitioners. The general meeting at the 
end was mainly used to share experiences, which were made during 
the course. Cases and certain situations, which occurred during a 
dialogue could be discussed in plenary. The purpose was to get 
feedback as well as new ideas, in addition to go further into still 
open questions. 
According to Grundtvig dialogues are the unique method of the 
“curriculum”, which also comprehended everyday life as a learning 
arena
20
. Because of this it was clear from the start of this course 
that the Socratic dialogues, which had to be performed and 
supervised, would not be offered as an additional school subject. 
Rather, the idea was to integrate them into the everyday life at the 
schools, like into ongoing classes, project days, staff meetings etc. 
A Socratic dialogue could for instance be conducted together with 
students in order to reflect on experiences made during an outdoor 
activity or a school trip abroad, with regards to the existential and 
ethical learning effects these experiences might have had on the 
students. Another possibility was to do Socratic dialogues with the 
teaching staff in order to develop and implement core values or 
new teaching strategies. On other occasions the Socratic method 
                                                          
20
 see FOLKEHØYSKOLENE: “Hva er folkehøyskole?” available in HU 
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was applied with the purpose of team building. In the following, 
several cases are presented in which Socratic dialogues were 
performed – these cases should also give a first glimpse of how and 
why philosophical practice can be understood as a philosophical 
“version” of participatory action research. 
 
Case 1: Implementing core values by means of the Socratic method 
 
The first case is about a Socratic dialogue that was performed at a 
school, which is owned by the municipality. The fact that the 
municipality is the owner of the school is important, because at a 
certain point the leaders of this municipality decided to develop 
new core values and mission statements. After this development-
process was finished and new core values and mission statements 
were “on the table”, a campaign was started in which all entities of 
the municipality were invited to implement these values and 
mission statements in their respective field of work. Now 
developing core values can be hard work, but implementing them 
can be even harder. The teaching staff of the respective folk high 
school knew that they had a difficult task to fulfill, because only 
putting up banners on the schoolyard with the core values printed 
on them would not do the job. The task included two main 
challenges. The first was how to actually implement core values, 
which were given to the school from outside? And the second, how 
to do this implementation in a way so that it would fit the school 
culture? Soon the idea came up to combine this task with the teach-
the-teachers program on philosophical practice and to perform 
Socratic dialogues on each of these values (these dialogues were 
part of the course mentioned above and facilitated by one of the 
teachers as well as supervised by a certified philosophical 
practitioner). In this way, the dialogue participants (which finally 
were both members from the teaching and the administrative staff 
as well as students) could share experiences by which they 
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experienced the value at stake. One of these dialogues, for 
example, was on the topic of “professionalism”, which was one of 
the core values to be implemented. Here the participants shared 
personal stories, which all started with “Once I experienced 
professionalism, when…” Most of these stories were about 
experiences made at the school. The result – the finding of this 
investigation, so to say – was how the value “professionalism” 
already was and can actually be practiced at the school. In other 
words, instead of discussing how professionalism should ideally be 
practiced, the participants of the dialogue came up with concrete 
examples of best practices by means of storytelling. In addition, the 
dialogue resulted in a common and more general definition and 
understanding of what professionalism actually means (at the 
school).  
With regards to participatory action research, we would like to 
summarize this case as follows: A school was confronted with the 
task to implement a set of core values, which was given to them 
from outside, namely from the municipality. However, there were 
no strategies offered on how to do that. Since the school culture of 
a folk high school leaves little room for top-down approaches, it 
was clear from the beginning that the implementation process 
would have to include both the teaching and administrative staff as 
well as the students in a rather democratic manner. Since it was not 
clear how to do the implementation, it seemed to be natural to tell 
each other stories in which these core values were once 
experienced and practiced. An advantage here was that many of 
these experiences were made at that school, because in this way the 
participants became aware of how these values were already 
practiced there. In the course of the Socratic dialogue certain best 
practices came to the fore. Since these practices were 
communicated in the form of stories, they were also easy to be 
remembered (simply because stories are much easier to remember 
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than i.e. plain theories or guidelines)21. However, what has to be 
mentioned is that it was not the direct goal of this Socratic dialogue 
to find and to develop best practices – the main goal was first and 
foremost to investigate this set of values by means of a 
philosophical-practical approach. And maybe this is also one of the 
main differences between action research and philosophical 
practice, that the latter is not focusing on finding solutions to a 
problem, but rather to reflect and to investigate the problem 
together with those who are concerned with it. That such 
investigations and self-reflections often lead to concrete actions, 
however, is undoubtedly the case. In this way, and as this previous 
case has shown, the three aspects of participation (all staff and 
students have been involved in the dialogue process), research (the 
core values have been investigated together and self-reflection was 
performed on how each participant of the dialogue could practice 
this value on his or her own) and action (in the form of best 
practices but also in the form of the dialogue itself) have been 
present in this dialogue.  
 
 
Case 2: Team building through philosophizing about the practice 
of pedagogical and educational ideals 
 
In the next case a Socratic dialogue setting is described in which 
both the teaching staff as well as the administrative staff from one 
school participated. It has to be mentioned that the administrative 
staff not only included the secretaries, but also the staff from the 
school kitchen as well as the school caretakers. The reason for this 
was that at this folk high school the opinion was shared, that not 
only the teaching staff but also the administrative employees 
                                                          
21
 see HEATH, Chip & HEATH, Dan: Made to stick. Why some ideas survive 
and others die, Random House, New York, 2007. 
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contributed essentially to what can be called formation (“danning” 
in Norwegian) with the students, which is the overall goal of all 
folk high schools: “The aim is to provide a formative (Bildungs) 
year, nurturing "the whole person".”
22
 One could also call this the 
pedagogical and education ideal of Norwegian folk high schools. 
Since in former times there was a rather strict distinction at folk 
high schools between the teaching staff and the administrative 
employees (a distinction which of course had an influence on the 
school culture as such), several measures had been taken at this 
respective school to unite these different “leagues” into a common 
team. One of these measures was that both the teachers and the 
administrative employees started to share a common staff room, 
where they would also have lunch together. This did not only foster 
the dialogue and the exchange between the two “leagues”, but it 
was also a clear sign that both the teaching staff and the 
administrative staff were equally important. Though the teachers 
and the administrative employees had different tasks to fulfill at 
their work, the idea was introduced that they still were working 
towards a common goal, namely formation with the students. This 
was a first step in the team building process (that is, uniting the two 
“leagues”). To go further into this process several other measures 
were taken over the years, and one of them was to perform a 
Socratic dialogue with all staff members on the question “Hva er 
god danning?” (in English “What is good formation?”). The overall 
goal of this Socratic dialogue was not to find a common definition 
of what good formation would be (this was rather seen as a natural 
outcome of the dialogue), but to hear, share and philosophize about 
stories, in which good formation was experienced. Because in this 
way the staff members would learn from each other how and by 
what means the process of formation was fostered in their different 
                                                          
22
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work contexts. In this case, however, the dialogue was not 
necessarily about best practices that were developed. Rather, this 
Socratic dialogue represented a collective self-reflection process in 
which the whole group and the whole team could become aware of 
the different situations at the school in which formation with the 
students was actually fostered. To philosophize about how the 
common goal of formation can be fostered in everyday life 
situations at the school, i.e. when cleaning the tables in the dining 
hall together with the students, and what formation in this context 
actually means, turned out to be quite fruitful for the team-building 
process among the staff members.  
First, because the staff members did not exchange on an 
everyday basis in what exact way they would contribute to their 
overall goal. Therefore, in this Socratic dialogue the different 
approaches and practices were not only voiced and heard, but also 
appreciated by the other team members (in this way, the 
participation aspect of participatory action research was included). 
Secondly, the different stories unveiled a bigger picture of the 
potential learning areas for formation, which the school as such had 
to offer (this was the result of the research, so to say – the second 
aspect of participatory action research.). This bigger picture, 
however, only became meaningful when each staff member of the 
school performed a self-reflective action so to say, namely self-
reflection in the sense of the question “What are my resources, my 
potentials – in terms of attitudes, ideas and social skills – to help 
unleash the potentials that the school as a whole is offering, in 
order to promote the over-all goal (that is formation with the 
students)?” In other words, the third aspect of participatory action 
research – which is action – received a double meaning here: On 
the one hand, it was about performing self-reflection (and here the 
narratives told in the dialogue became a vital resource for this type 
of action). On the other hand, it was about becoming aware of 
potential actions (as a result of self-reflection), which the respective 
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staff member could undertake in order to contribute to the overall 
goal (which was formation). 
 
Case 3: Experience-sharing between colleagues form different 
work places 
 
The last short case is about one of the regional meetings as 
described previously. At this meeting ten teachers from four folk 
high schools participated. The Socratic dialogue, which was 
performed in this meeting was facilitated by two certified 
philosophical practitioners. The teachers were in the role of 
participants. One of the goals of this dialogue was to make the 
teachers more aware of the respective steps and procedures of such 
a dialogue, so that they could facilitate Socratic dialogues on their 
own in the upcoming local meetings. The topic of the dialogue was 
courage, and the teachers were sharing many different stories 
where they once experienced courage at their schools. The outcome 
of this dialogue was not only a general definition of courage. But 
rather, the actual benefit of this dialogue was that by means of 
story-telling the teachers could become more familiar with each 
other, as well as familiar with certain educational practices from 
other schools (the teachers did not know each other at all, or at least 
not very well). Especially the latter aspect seems to be important 
for the educational idea of folk high schools: Courage is not just 
one of the cardinal virtues of Aristotle, but developing virtues with 
the students is seen as an essential aspect of formation at folk high 
schools. Now, sharing experiences where someone acted 
courageously at one school was understood by the other teachers in 
the sense of “leading by example” – and “leading by example” can 
be seen as a guiding educational principle at folk high schools. And 
last but not least, this case shows that the Socratic dialogue method 
is a suitable approach to make people, who do not know each other 
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from before, philosophize together and to share stories with each 
other – something which should not be taken for granted. 
In order to point out how this particular dialogue relates to the 
three central aspects of participatory action research (participation, 
action and research), we would like to start with the aspect of 
research: Research in this dialogue was done in the sense that the 
participants were investigating an ethical value together – they 
were philosophizing about it (that is, doing philosophical research, 
so to say). Participation was in place since all dialogue participants 
were sharing stories and reflecting on them – all of them were 
engaged and involved in the dialogue process. In contrast to these 
two aspects, which seem to be rather obvious, was the third aspect: 
action. The actual action that was performed in this dialogue was 
not planned or intended, it just happened incidentally – it was “to 
get familiar with each other”. At first sight this might not appear 
like an action, however it can be understood as a form of social 
inter-action, which is vital for any kind of dialogue: “To get 
familiar with each other” is a necessary prerequisite for the so-
called togetherness, which seems to be an indispensable element in 
any form of dialoguing. Only when this togetherness between the 
dialogue partners is established, the ethical values of trust, honesty 
and authenticity (which seem to be essential for the course of a 
dialogue) can start to evolve. 
 
 
Socratic dialogues as philosophical “versions” of participatory 
action research 
 
By means of these three short case studies we intended to point out 
how the three main aspects of participatory action research (namely 
participation, research, action) are also present in Socratic 
dialogues, and hence, why and how the Socratic dialogue setting 
can also be understood as a research setting. In this regard, the 
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community of inquiry concept, which is central in a Socratic 
dialogue setting, plays a decisive role: The dialogue participants 
(those who are concerned with a certain topic, like certain core 
values in the context of their work) and the dialogue facilitator (the 
philosophical practitioner) form an investigative fellowship of “co-
researchers”, so to say. In a community of inquiry there is no 
expert-layman-hierarchy, neither is there a counselor-counselee 
role model in place, there is no teacher and no students. In a 
Socratic dialogue the philosophical investigation – the research, so 
to say – is not done “on” nor “for” but “with” people. The 
philosophical practitioner is seen to be “on eye level” with the 
dialogue participants – practitioner and participants are 
philosophizing together. Therefore, if people who are involved in 
action research processes are also called communities of practice23, 
then the people involved in a Socratic dialogue could be called 
communities of philosophical practice. 
 
 
The “research objects” of Socratic dialogues when understood 
as participatory action research 
 
As all these three short cases above show, the research objects of a 
Socratic dialogue are not objects of research in a traditional sense 
(as cancer or global warming would be, for example). The research 
objects of a Socratic dialogue are rather phenomena constituted by 
the language employed within the dialogues (i.e. ethical values). 
The phenomenon or term under investigation comes to life in and 
through the dialogues – especially through the narratives, which are 
shared and which constitute the initial and decisive part of such 
dialogues. In other words, the research object of a Socratic dialogue 
                                                          
23
 see LAVE, Jean & WENGER, Etienne: Situated Learning: Legitimate 
Peripheral Participation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. 
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when understood as participatory action research is the Socratic 
dialogue itself, and the phenomena, which are occurring through it 
– in short: the story-telling as such is the actual action which is 
investigated. The question now is, what can be the result of such an 
investigation? Here another reference to more traditional action 
research comes to the fore: action learning.   
 
 
Socratic dialogues as action learning 
 
The short case studies as presented here were about Socratic 
dialogues, which had certain learning effects on the participants – 
even though most of these effects were neither intended nor 
planned. Nevertheless, when understanding Socratic dialoguing as 
a specific form of action, then one can say that the participants of 
the previously presented dialogues learned something by means of 
telling narratives and reflecting them philosophically. However, the 
decisive point is: What the participants learned cannot be taught, so 
to say. Through self-reflection and self-insight the participants 
learned about certain values, attitudes, mindsets and how they can 
transcend, transform and even further develop and apply them in 
practice. The outcome of such an action-oriented learning process 
is not knowledge (which would be the goal in traditional forms of 
research), rather it is what one could call awareness (i.e. the 
awareness of how to practice an ethical value in a given situation). 
In this way, one could also call a Socratic dialogue to be socio-
pedagogical in nature. 
 
 
Differences between Socratic dialoguing and action research 
 
There are of course also main differences between Socratic 
dialoguing and participatory action research. Participatory action 
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research often has a very specific goal, i.e. to solve a certain 
problem together with the people who are directly concerned with 
that problem. A Socratic dialogue, on the other hand, is not 
necessarily goal-oriented. This, however, can also be seen as one of 
the advantages of the Socratic dialogue setting: Problems are 
investigated, reflected and seen from different perspectives without 
the direct intention to solve these problems – and only because of 
this “intention-free” approach, completely unexpected and genuine 
ideas on the problem can appear (which then often can be 
“translated” into solutions). In other words, in a Socratic dialogue 
you learn to “let go” of a problem – and often it is exactly this 
“letting go”-attitude, which leads to valuable (self-)insights, and 
eventually even to unexpected and ground-breaking solutions. But 
this, again, is a side effect of a Socratic dialogue, so to say, whereas 
in participatory action research it would be an explicit goal.  
 
 
Concluding questions instead of concluding remarks 
 
Instead of making concluding remarks at the end of this article, we 
would rather like to pose some concluding questions. This simply 
seems to be more natural in the context of philosophical practice, 
since authentic philosophizing often leads to further questions than 
to final conclusions. The questions below may not be so easily 
understood by those readers who never participated in a Socratic 
dialogue, since they represent questions, which came to us after and 
during several years of experience with Socratic dialoguing. 
Nevertheless, or just because of these years of experience, they feel 
important to us. 
In this paper we have, among other things, taken a closer look 
at the interactive processes unfolding between the participants of a 
Socratic dialogue. This leads us to our first question: What happens 
when our personal narratives – and with that also our thinking and 
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telling about ourselves – are put to play in a socio-pedagogical 
context, in which stories are imparted, recreated and elaborated by 
a community of inquiry? To be more precise: Are there any 
remains of individuality left in the totality of disseminations, 
comparisons of stories and after the interactive “thickening” and 
elaboration of these stories? And if it is so, how are they 
expressed? 
Another question is about an aspect of Socratic dialoguing, 
which could be called “re-remembering”: What is 
phenomenologically happening when we “re-remember” (that is 
having the story present in mind after we told it), and how does this 
interact with and is influenced by the verbal storytelling? On the 
phenomenological level we talk about how stories are created, 
starting from personal experiences, and how these stories are 
formed by the act of recollection and creation. So the next question 
is: How does this kind of recollection and creation relate to other 
kinds of recollection and creation like writing, dramatization, 
visualizing, which represent other ways of reproducing memories? 
A question, which is also about the relation and interaction between 
storyteller and audience, that is, the specific ways the stories are 
told to and received by a story-telling and inquiring audience. 
The last group of questions has been (and is) one of the most 
important from a philosophical point of view: When an ethical 
subject is chosen and the story is elaborated based on this subject 
(for example, “What does it mean to be brave?”), then in what 
ways is this story, and its particular parts, relevant in regards to the 
understanding and practical application of the virtue in question (in 
this case the virtue of courage)? Furthermore, another interesting 
question in a Socratic dialogue is how conclusions based on the 
descriptions of the selected story can shed light on the others’ 
stories. To which extent is there a correlation between our existing, 
common (pre-)understanding of, for example, the virtue of courage 
and individual stories about it (also those which are not shared in 
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the respective Socratic dialogue) – and the other way around? In 
other words, is common sense also operating in the realms of 
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